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the period from 1994 to 2000, we attempted to establish the link between finance and 
poverty in Ethiopia. Our results show that access to finance is an important factor in 
consumption smoothing and hence poverty reduction. We also found evidence for a 
poverty trap due to liquidity constraints that limits the ability of the rural households 
from consumption smoothing. The empirical findings from this study could inform 
finance policies aimed at addressing issues of poverty reduction. 
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1 Introduction 
The year 1992 marked a policy watershed in the Ethiopian financial sector, as well as 
the country’s economic policy at large. This was the period where a shift from a 
controlled to market friendly policy regime was made. The new government continued 
with the policy of state ownership of major financial institutions, with major reforms 
such as operational autonomy and streamlining of some activities, expansion of credit 
and savings facilities, and adherence to prudent monetary and banking policy. In 
addition, the sector was, for the first time, opened to the private sector. The World Bank 
and IMF supported the financial liberalization programme through their Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP), which started in late 1992. 
The major development in the financial sector during the post-reform period is the 
reorientation of the sector away from its bias to the socialized sectors. Unlike the pre-
1991 military-cum-socialist regime—called the Derg, which simply set the financial 
sector to the service of public enterprises and cooperatives, the post-reform period 
shows a market-based allocation of credits and financial services. Following this 
reform, the private sector is claiming the lion’s share of total credits disbursed by the 
banking system. In contrast, public enterprises have seen their share declining through 
the years. Apart from the effect of the market based credit allocation, the considerable 
decline in the share of credits to public enterprises may be attributed to the privatization 
process, which, in effect, reduced the number of clients deemed as public entities. The 
result is that the financial system has evolved into an ownership structure which is 
mixed (public and private) and largely guided by market forces. 
There are various studies that attempted to evaluate the effect of these reforms on the 
efficiency and growth of the financial sector (see Alemayehu 2005 and Addison and 
Alemayehu 2003, for instance). However, one area that is neglected is the relationship 
between the liberalization of the financial sectors and the pervasive poverty that is 
haunting the country. With an absolute poverty level of about 42 per cent, it is 
imperative that one needs to examine the link between finance and poverty. Thus, this 
paper tries to fill this gap by looking at this relationship in the rural households of 
Ethiopia who make over 80 per cent of the Ethiopian population. 
Access to and efficiency of the financial sector are important elements in reducing 
poverty through lessening the financial constraints of the poor and enabling them to 
invest in a risky but profitable environment. Some empirical evidence shows that the 
inefficiency of the financial sector could lead to a high transaction cost for the poor who 
lead them to switch the form of saving and investment into physical assets. In Ghana 80 
per cent of savings are in terms of physical assets while the figure for India is 50 per 
cent (see Srinivasan and Wallack 2004). This incapacitates the poor from earning 
interest income and engaging in high return but risky ventures. Moreover, it would also 
make hedging against inflation more difficult as part of their saving contain liquid cash. 
Lack of financial access coupled with low endowment may lead to self perpetuating 
poverty. Households with low endowment and no/limited financial access tend to invest 
in low risk and low return areas and hence earn low return. This constraints the poor to 
investment on long term high return areas such as education. Moreover, households will 
also be faced with borrowing constrains which makes consumption smoothing very   2
difficult. The combined effect of these forces is to significantly reduce the welfare of 
the poor resulting in possible perpetuation of poverty, sometimes even across 
generations. 
As we noted above, while there is a wide literature on financial sector performance and 
its impact on growth (both globally and in Ethiopia), empirical work on its impact on 
the poor using micro data is still scanty. This paper would document some evidence 
using the panel data from Ethiopia that covers the period from 1994 to 2000. 
Specifically, we attempted to: (i) test the impact of access to credit on poverty; 
(ii) investigate the importance of access to credit for consumption smoothing and hence 
the welfare of the population; and (iii) test for the possibility of a poverty trap due to 
financial markets imperfections. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly summarizes the 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the relationship between poverty and finance. 
Section 3 describes the poverty profile of Ethiopia, as well as the nature of saving and 
access to credit. Section 4 presents the theoretical framework and the estimation results 
of a model that attempts to depict the relationship between poverty and access to credit. 
Sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2 examine in detail this link between poverty and finance by 
identifying the channels through which finance could impact on poverty. Thus, it offers 
empirical evidence on the link between consumption smoothing and access to credit as 
well as the result about the possibility of a poverty trap due to liquidity constraint. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2  Finance and poverty 
It can be hypothesized that there is a link between poverty and finance. In a more subtle 
manner, Banerjee and Newman (1993) showed that the distribution on initial wealth 
coupled with imperfect capital market determines the occupational choice of an 
individual and hence the level of one’s and one’s offspring’s income. Due to capital 
market imperfection, individuals’ borrowing capacity would be limited by the level of 
their initial wealth. This would, in effect, rule out the poor from investing in high return 
investment ventures (Banerjee and Newman 1993). 
The credit market imperfection can also affect the poor through human capital 
accumulation. Galor and Zeira (1993) showed that with capital market imperfection and 
unequal distribution of wealth, those with higher initial endowment would invest on 
human capital while those with no or lower initial endowment would face a higher 
interest rate and hence tend to invest less on human capital. To the extent that earnings 
depend on human capital, the rich that invest on human capital would remain rich while 
the poor remain poor and stay in the unskilled labour sector showing that the liquidity 
constraint stems from the imperfect capital market is particularly binding on the poor. 
This rising level of inequality would, in turn, aggravate poverty. In the Ethiopian case, 
empirical evidence shows that inequality is one of the major determinants of poverty. 
Inequality aggravates poverty by 1 percentage point compared to a reduction of 2 
percentage points that could be obtained from a growth rate of 1 percentage point (see 
Alemayehu et al. 2003).   3
Better financial intermediation is, thus, expected to ease the liquidity constraints faced 
by the poor in addition to containing the adverse impact of initial wealth distribution. 
The evidence in this respect is mixed. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) theoretically 
demonstrate that given that there is a lump-sum cost of accessing the financial 
intermediary, agents below some minimum level of savings remain outside of the 
formal financial market. As a result, at the early state of financial development 
inequality across the very rich and the very poor increases, as it is only the rich who 
would have access to the financial markets. Over time, with the growth in the wealth of 
the poor, the poor would gain access to the financial intermediary and hence stable 
distribution of wealth can be achieved. 
In terms of the empirical evidence, the results reported in Beck et al. (2004) suggest that 
financial development is pro-poor. Using a sample of 52 developed and developing 
countries over the period 1960–99, they obtained that the income of the lowest quintile 
grows faster than average per capita GDP with a fall in inequality in countries with 
better financial intermediary. In a more focused study, Amin et al. (2003) showed, using 
panel data from Bangladesh, that microfinance institutions, which are targeted to 
directly address the poor, are effective in reaching the poor. However, they reported that 
microfinance institutions are less successful in reaching the vulnerable, which are the 
very poor among the population. As opposed to Amin et al. (2003), also using panel 
data from Bangladesh, Khandker (2003) showed that microfinance is important in 
reducing poverty and it also matters even for the very poor by increasing their 
consumption. 
Given the empirical evidence about the positive correlation between financial 
development and growth (see Levine et al. 2000, for instance) and to the extent that 
growth is pro-poor, better financial intermediation would be pro-poor. Apart from its 
growth impact and enabling the poor to invest in risky but profitable environment, 
access to credit may enhance the welfare of the poor by reducing liquidity constraints 
and consumption variability. We will test these hypotheses below. 
3  Poverty, savings and access to credit in Ethiopia 
At a per capita income of around USD 100, Ethiopia is one of the poorest nations on 
earth. The state of poverty is one of appalling human suffering and persistent 
deprivations. The evidence of recent periods shows that 40-50 per cent of households in 
Ethiopia live in abject poverty and that it has been persistent over time. The measure of 
poverty reported in this study is based on the Foster-Greer-Thorbeke index (see Foster 
et al. 1984) which essentially aggregates poverty based on the income of the poor. 
Given the income of the population by the vector: y1<y2<,…..zq<,..yn, (where n is the 
number of the total population, and q is the number of the poor population), the Foster-

















α  [1] 
Where α is a measure of the degree of inequality aversion among the poor population. 
In this report, we focus on α = 0, which basically gives the proportion of the poor  
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Table 1(a) Evolution of urban poverty in Ethiopia 
Year  Headcount ratio  Poverty gap Poverty squared gap
1994 39.4  15.2  8.0 
1995 37.6  14.0  7.2 
1997 34.2  13.1  6.8 
2000 47.4  19.4  10.6 
Source: Shimeles (2004a). 
 
Table 1(b) Evolution of rural poverty in Ethiopia 
Year  Headcount ratio  Poverty gap Poverty squared gap
1994 42  17.2  9 
1995 37  17.3  9.8 
1997 35  17.1  8.8 
2000 50  22.0  12.8 
Source: Shimeles (2004a). 
 
population, or the headcount ratio, α = 1 provides the poverty gap, which measures the 
average deprivation among the poor and α = 2 is a measure of how sever poverty is 
among the population. Tables 1(a) and 1(b) report these measures for Ethiopia from 
1994–2000 based on a unique panel data set collected over the last few years by the 
Department of Economics of Addis Ababa University and its various collaborative 
institutions.1 
As Tables 1(a) and 1(b) clearly indicate the percentage of households who are unable to 
meet the barest minimum basic needs in both urban and rural Ethiopia are substantial. 
The minimum income per adult in real terms is calculated to be around Birr 2 per person 
per day2 for the reference survey site. This poverty line is quite lower than the one 
dollar a day (a dollar is about 8.65 Birr at the nominal exchange rate) in PPP globally 
used to measure extreme poverty. It is therefore self evident that Ethiopia harbors one of 
the worst human conditions in the world. The other measures of poverty, such as 
poverty gap and squared poverty gap show quite a lower degree of deprivation and 
severity as the maximum that these values take is the headcount ratio. So, for instance, 
the poverty gap is in most cases less than half of the headcount ratio. In effect, a lot 
                                                 
1   The panel data is collected by Addis Ababa University, in collaboration with Oxford University, 
Center for the Study of African Economies, IFPRI and Michigan State University. The panel started 
with approximately 1500 households in 1994 and has been active since then. The result reported in 
this study covers the period 1994–2000. For an extensive discussion of this data see for instance 
Bigsten et al. (2003). 
2   The poverty line is computed on the basis of food and non-food (non-durables) basic needs by taking 
into account consumption preferences of the poorest population and price differences across rural and 
urban areas. For further details see Bigsten et al. (2005).   5
more people are concentrated around the poverty line so that absolute poverty is a 
serious policy concern than the relative deprivation of the poor. 
The trend in poverty is not encouraging either. Between 1994 and 1997, there has been 
some sign of hope as poverty declined and per capita income increased. The situation in 
2000 however showed an increase in poverty as the country struggled through difficult 
periods, such as the war with Eritrea and a major drought. 
Poverty is much more persistence in urban than in rural areas (see Table 2). The 
percentage of the persistently poor in urban areas is twice that in rural areas suggesting 
the limited income earning opportunities in urban areas. 
We also provide the factors that are closely correlated with the persistence of poverty in 
Tables 3(a) and 3(b), where we can read that in both urban and rural households the 
persistence of poverty is positively associated with household size, that is, the higher the 
household size the more persistent poverty would be; and the levels of the household 
head’s education, the value of assets owned (including the number of oxen) and the size 
of land are negatively correlated with the persistence of poverty. In urban areas, the 
persistence of poverty declines with being a civil servant, in private business or a 
private sector employee. On the other hand, poverty is more persistent among the 
unemployed, casual workers and dwellers of the capital. 
The micro-evidence on the state of household savings and access to credit indicates that, 
particularly in rural Ethiopia, savings in the form of cash is hardly a common practice. 
The panel data set collected over the period of six years, from 1994 up to 2000, shows 
features typical of a very poor and subsistence economy. Accordingly, among nearly 
1500 households in the panel, only 0.7 per cent of respondents in rural areas reported 
having a bank account in 1994 and 15.6 per cent said that they belonged to a traditional 
rotating saving club/group (Iqub) in that period. Iqub in its simplest form is a culture of 
group savings meant usually to raise money to finance large expenses relative to the 
current income of the members. This is usually meant to finance events like weddings, 
funerals, religious observances, purchases of household durables and some types of 
non-durables, like clothing and shoes; or even for investment purposes like the purchase 
of livestock, fertilizers, and other ventures, like house construction. What Iqub members 
do is that each contributes a certain previously agreed sum to the group every week, 
 
Table 2 Percentage of households by poverty status: 1994–2000 
Poverty status  Rural  Urban 
Always poor  7.3  15.4 
Once poor  28.9  20.4 
Twice poor  23.0  18.3 
Thrice poor  20.0  16.0 
Never poor  20.8  29.9 
Source: Shimeles (2004b).   6













Household size (numbers)  4.9  5.8  6.4  6.9  8.3 
Age of head of household (years)  44  46  47  47  48 
Female headed household (%)  23  22  18  22  16 
Household head with primary education (%)  12  10  7  7  3 
Wife completed primary school (%)  4  2  2  1  1 
Land size (hectare)  1.1  0.9  0.7  0.7  0.5 
Crop sale (Birr)  334  247  158  83  90 
Asset value (Birr)  225  173  152  87  92 
Off-farm employment (%)  24  38  39  45  29 
No. of oxen owned  2.0  1.7  1.4  1.1  0.78 
Source: Shimeles (2004b) 













Household size (numbers)  5.7  6.3  6.6  6.9  7.6 
Age of head of household (years)  47  49  50  48  51 
Female headed household (%)  40  44  46  39  43 
Household head with primary education (%)  60  44  30  27  20 
Wife with primary education (%)  33  21  16  12  8 
Private business (%)  3  2  2  0  0 
Own account employee (%)  19  17  15  12  16 
Civil servant (%)  21  15  11  9  9 
Public sector employee (%)  9  7  5  6  5 
Private sector employee (%)  6  5  5  3  3 
Casual worker (%)  4  6  7  14  32 
Unemployed (%)  4  4  7  4  9 
Resides in the capital (%)  68  71  79  78  87 
Source: Shimeles (2004b). 
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month or quarter, depending on the prior set intervals, and the collected money is given 
to one person at a time. In some sense Iqub undertakes saving and lending activities 
simultaneously. Typically members wait for their turn to collect the money raised 
through such contributions. Customarily, the queue for getting the collected money is 
established by drawing lots. But, it is also common to arrange it on mutual consent, with 
the needy coming first. In many ways, Iqub is a mechanism for group insurance, 
frequently used to overcome idiosyncratic shocks, and also a form of medium to 
develop social networks with neighbours. Iqub is much less common in urban areas than 
rural areas, where people have relatively predictable flow of income over the Iqub 
period, and a number of mechanisms exist for easy enforcement, including legal 
remedies. 
The relative size of Iqub reported in the data for rural households is quite interesting. 
The median contribution to Iqub was close to Birr 90 per household over a period of 
four months. This is close to 5 per cent of total household consumption expenditure in 
the period. A parallel is also discovered with our result from nationally representative 
data on savings. First, the percentage of households who reported positive savings from 
this data was around 15 per cent, which is close to the percentage of households with 
similar saving status in the panel data. Second, the percentage of savings from mean 
income was around 5 per cent, which is close to the average propensity to save that we 
found for the panel data (which is also consistent with the macro data of the last decade 
that show a gross domestic figure of about 6 per cent). In all likelihood, household cash 
savings are much lower in Ethiopia, mainly due to very low income level and partly also 
due to lack of efficient financial intermediation. 
On the other hand, there is significant credit activity among households in the country. 
The percentage of households who took a loan at least once in the five years’ preceding 
the survey year (1994) was 40 per cent, while the rest did not borrow money at all. The 
largest sources of this credit are relatives and friends, followed by village moneylenders 
(see Table 4). In the recent survey of 2004, the proportion of households who took a 
loan in the 12 months prior to the survey period increased to around 54 per cent. Half of 
the households who did not take a loan reported that they did not face the need for 
credit, while the remaining were constrained by different factors including lack of 
access, fear of not paying back and rejection of the loan application (see Table 5). 
 
Table 4 Source of loan: rural households 
Source of loan  Percentage




Source: Authors’ computations. 
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Table 5 Reasons for not taking a loan 
Reasons  Percentage 
No need for a loan  50.8 
Tried to get a loan but was refused  3.1 
No one available to get a loan from  9.3 
Expected to be rejected, so did not try to get one  1.3 
No access to collateral  0.5 
Afraid of losing collateral  1.1 
Afraid that I cannot pay back  31.1 
Interest rates too high  1.8 
Other  0.8 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Evidence from the 2004 survey of the panel households also highlighted the importance 
of access to credit in raising funds for emergency purposes. The data show that only 
around 57 per cent of rural households can obtain 100 Birr (around USD 11.5, which is 
a significant amount of money for them) if the household is in an emergency. Of those 
who can obtain the money, credit and saving associations are the source of the fund for 
about 39 per cent of the households, followed by a sale of animala at 37 per cent (see 
Table 6). As sales of animals, particularly oxen, might have an adverse impact on farm 
production and income, credit would remain an important shock copping mechanism. 
It is also interesting to note that access to loans is an increasing function of the level of 
income, except for the top rich category (see Table 7). Table 8 shows that households 
that have access to credit, compared to those who had not, are relatively less poor, 
although the distinction between these two groups is not that strong. 
 
Table 6 Ability to raise money for emergency 
If the household needed 100 Birr for an emergency, 
could the household obtain it within a week? 
 
How would the household obtain 100 Birr? 
   Percentage     Percentage 
Yes  57.1  Sale of animals  37.4 
No  42.9  Sale of farm/ business assets  7.4 
   Sale of household asset  1.7 
   Own cash  7.4 
   Saving association  5.7 
   Loan  33.5 
   Sale of crops  7.0 
   Other  0.1 
Source: Authors’ computation.   9
Table 7 Access to credit by deciles distribution of ‘permanent income’ 
Deciles  Percentage with access to credit (%) 









Richest deciles  3.61 
Households with access to credit (%) 40.00 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
 
Table 8 Chronic poverty and access to credit, 1994–2000 
Household types  Long term poverty, P0 
Households with access to credit  28       (43) 
Households with no access to credit  33       (47) 
Source: Authors’ computations. Figures in parenthesis indicate urban poverty.  
 
4  The theoretical framework and estimation results: finance and poverty  
There is general consensus on the basic premise that economic growth is central to 
achieve the objective of poverty reduction. In the literature, however, there is also a 
debate on the type of growth, that is, whether it is pro-growth or not, and the extent to 
which the poor gain from growth. Among others, studies by Bruno et al. (1995), 
Ravallion and Chen (1997), Deininger and Squire (1998) and Birdsall and Londono 
(1997) reported that growth has a positive impact on reducing income poverty though 
its effectiveness differs depending on the initial inequality level. In the cases where 
growth is inequitable in the poor countries, as indicated in the Kuznet hypothesis, the 
poverty reducing impact of growth may be hampered.   10
Following this literature and supporting empirical evidence in Ethiopia (see Alemayehu 
et al. 2003) we specify the level of poverty as a function of income, inequality and other 
household characteristics. 
P = f (Y, G, H)       [1] 
Where P is the level of poverty, Y is income, G is inequality and H household specific 
characteristics such as education and asset holdings. 
Now turning to the determinants of poverty, we can specify the dynamics of income and 
inequality. As the rural households are mainly engaged in agricultural activities, what 
happens to agriculture directly affects their income. Thus, we specify a simple 
production function as: 
Y = f (X, F)      [2] 
where Y is output 
  X is a vector of physical inputs including labour, land, oxen used in the 
production process. 
  F is availability of credit. 
Finally, we hypothesized inequality to depend on initial endowment and access to 
finance as in Banerjee and Newman (1993). We proxy initial endowment by the quality 
of land and number of oxen the household own. 
G = f (E, F)      [3] 
Where E   Initial endowment 
Combining [1], [2] and [3], we can estimate a reduced form equation that links poverty 
with access to finance as: 
P= f(X, E, F, H)        [4] 
In a panel framework the estimatable version of equation [4] can be written as 
()
it i it it it
it it it it
u c Asset Educ Credit
LandSZ OXEN HHSZ P
+ + + +
+ + + + =
) ( ) ( ) (                
) ( ) (
6 5 4
3 2 1 0
β β β
β β β β
     [5] 
Where P is a dummy variable indicating the absolute poverty status of the household; 
HHSZ is household size that we used as a proxy for labour; OXEN is the number of 
oxen owned by the household which can be used as a proxy for capital owing to the ox-
plough culture in Ethiopia; LandSZ is size of land holding by the household; Credit is 
an indicator of whether the household has access to credit or not; Educ is the level of 
education of the household head; Asset is the total current assets of the household, c is 
the individual heterogeneity term that may contain initial endowment and other 
household specific heterogeneity; u is the idiosyncratic error term. 
We estimated equation [5] using fixed effect logit estimator to account for a possible 
correlation between the individual heterogeneity and the explanatory variables. The   11
fixed effect logit estimation has an advantage over both the random effect and fixed 
effect probit models in that it accounts for the possible correlation between the 
explanatory variables and unobserved heterogeneity without running into incidental 
parameter problem as ci is not estimated along with the βs (see Wooldridge 2002). 
Table 9(a) presents the estimation result. 
The result shows that, controlling for other factors, the probability of being poor 
increases with the availability of credit, which is counter-intuitive. We suspected that 
this is mainly due to the endogeneity of credit in our specification. That is, on the one 
hand the probability of being poor declines with the availability of credit and on the 
other hand, availability of credit is also determined by the poverty status of the 
household. This might drive our estimates to be inconsistent. As a result, we resorted to 
instrumental variable probit estimation to address the endogeniety problem. 
 
Table 9(a) Result of the logit fixed effect model 
Dependent: absolute poverty 
 Coefficient  z-values 
Household size  0.08  (2.05)* 
Total land of household in hectares  -0.25  (5.93)** 
Number oxen owned   0.03  (0.55) 
Credit 0.38  (3.56)** 
Total current value of household assets  0.00  (1.54) 
Observations     2083 
Notes:   Education level of the household head is omitted due to no within-group variance.  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
The main problems in using the IV estimation are getting a ‘right’ instrumental 
variable(s) and that the other variables in the model are exogenous. We argued that the 
total asset holding of the household, number of oxen owned and total crop sales to be 
good indicators of access to credit as they show the repayment capacity of the 
household. However, since total asset holdings and crop sales are correlated with the 
dependant variable, we could not use them as instrument. Rather, we used the total 
number of oxen to instrument for credit as it is not significantly correlated with the 
dependent variable as shown in our fixed effect logit model. The result of our IV probit 
estimation is presented in Table 9(b). 
Our IV probit result passes the Wald test for exogeneity, thus, confirming the 
endogniety problems we noted earlier. The result in Table 9(b) shows that availability of 
credit has a significant impact in reducing the probability of being poor. This 
underscores the importance of finance (and financial development) in reducing poverty. 
   12
Table 9(b) Probit estimation of poverty and credit 
   Coefficients  Marginal effects 
Credit -1.285  -0.4788671 
   (0.000)***    
Household sze  0.078  0.0310112 
   (0.000)***    
Total land of household in hectares  -0.119  -0.0475257 
   (0.000)***    
Has the household head completed primary school?  -0.242  -0.0954966 
   (0.002)***    
Female headed households  0.091  0.036457 
   (0.084)*    
Has the wife completed primary school?  -0.149  -0.0588589 
   -0.344    
Age of household head  0  -0.0001902 
   -0.719    
Crop sales   0  -0.0001602 
   (0.000)***    
Off farm employment 0.113  0.0449408 
   (0.007)***    
Constant 0.46     
   (0.059)*    
Observations 3637     
Robust p values in parentheses       
Notes:  Wald test of exogeneity (/athrho = 0): chi2(1) = 9.78 Prob > chi2 = 0.0018. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
One caveat to note in estimating the model in [5] allowing for the possible endogeneity 
between poverty and the access to finance is the fact that the endogenous variable is 
also a dummy variable. When the endogenous variable is a binary one having a non-
normal distribution, the instrumental variable method may not be valid. As a result, we 
also used a bivariate probit model to deal with the problem of endogeneity and check 
the reliability of our result. 
To allow for the possible unobserved correlation between poverty (P) and access to 
finance (C), we let the error terms of the two equations to be distributed as a bivariate 
normal. As our interest is to model the relationship between these two discrete 
variables, the decisions involve four cases – that is, P = 0 and 1; and C = 0 and 1. The 
likelihood function that captures these features can be presented as a bivariate probit 
model (see Carrasco 1998 and Evans and Schwab 1995). The bivariate probit model 
can, hence, be formulated as   13
 
() () () ( ) () 0 ; 1 ; c o v ,
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  [6] 
 
The model is identified if there is at least one variable in Z that is not contained in X. As 
in our previous estimation, we used number of oxen owned as an identifying instrument. 
The result of the bivariate model is presented in Table 9(c). 
Table 9(c) Bivariate Probit estimation of poverty and credit 
      Marginal effects  Auxilary regression 
   Poverty  Pr(poverty = 1, 
credit = 1)  Credit 
Credit -0.927  -0.2093725    
   (0.000)***       
Household sze  0.092  0.0197964  -0.016 
   (0.000)***     (0.027)** 
Total land of household in hectares  -0.136  -0.0374564  -0.027 
   (0.000)***     (0.044)** 
Has the household head completed 
primary school?  -0.227 -0.091633  -0.244 
   (0.005)***     (0.003)*** 
Female headed households  0.107  0.0278861  0.013 
   (0.042)**     -0.809 
Has the wife completed primary school?  -0.209  -0.03525  0.154 
   -0.18     -0.31 
Age of household head  -0.001  -0.0000825  0.001 
   -0.615     -0.712 
Crop sales   -0.000483  -0.000107  0.000064 
   (0.000)***     -0.123 
Off farm employment 0.118  0.0417128  0.079 
   (0.006)***     (0.073)* 
Number oxen owned  
(bulls, oxen and young bulls)        0.074 
         (0.000)*** 
Constant 0.207      0.182 
   -0.201     (0.028)** 
Observations 3637      3637 
Rho  0.6398438       
Wald test of rho=0: Prob >Chi2  (0.0003)***       
Notes:  Robust p values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Our result suggests that the bivariate specification is a valid one as ρ is significantly 
different from zero. Controlling for household characteristics and other factors, our 
result shows that availability of credit significantly and negatively affects the 
probability of being poor. As the marginal effects suggest availability of credit reduces 
the probability of being poor by around 21 per cent. This reduction is much lower than 
what our instrumental variable estimation result has provided, that is, 47 per cent. 
The overall picture suggested the importance of access to finance for poverty reduction. 
Thus, it is imperative to examine the channels through which finance, as found in 
Tables 9(b) and 9(c), could affect poverty. We identified two major channels through 
which it does affect poverty: (i) through consumption smoothing and (ii) through 
allowing to skip poverty trap that could emanate from liquidity constraint. The next two 
sections offer empirical evidence on this. 
4.1  Consumption smoothing and access to credit 
Due to the dependence of the rural economy on rain-fed agriculture, the income and 
consumption of the rural population are highly volatile depending on the weather. With 
the absence of formal insurance and credit market, consumption smoothing is one of the 
most difficult challenges for rural households. As can be read from Table 2, about 
29  per cent of the rural population in the sample fall into poverty at least once, 
indicating the difficulty in smoothing consumption for which liquidity constraint and 
absence of insurance mechanisms could be the main culprits. Though the rural farmers 
adopt different consumption and income smoothing mechanisms with absent or under 
developed formal insurance and credit market (see Morduch 1995, for instance), access 
to credit from the informal market and running down one’s assets and savings are still 
important smoothing mechanisms. 
As a credit market is not completely lacking in rural villages, using a model of 
consumption determination, it is possible to pick up the importance of access to credit 
for consumption smoothing. Equation (1) provides an estimating equation of the 
determinants of long term consumption (Ci) on a set of exogenous variables (X). Since 
Ci is mean consumption over six years for each household i the vector of explanatory 
variables are all initial endowments as reported in 1994. Thus, the Xs in equation (1) are 
instruments uncorrelated with the error term and OLS gives consistent and efficient 
estimates of the regression coefficients. 
i i e X C + + = β β0 ln      (1) 
The estimated results of this model are reported in Table (10) and are quite interesting 
in many ways. Long term income of a typical rural household is negatively correlated 
with size of the household, the head of the household, that is, whether female or male. 
On the other hand, such factors as initial wealth, assets, experience and most of all 
access to credit have a positive effect on ‘permanent’ consumption. This is a further 
evidence of the positive role that access to credit plays on household welfare. The 
importance of access to finance in reducing poverty is especially important since 
income variability is a major factor in inflicting poverty in Ethiopia. The latter can be 
inferred from the fact that the transitory component of poverty which comprises about 
15 to 20 percentage points of the total poverty. Access to credit, thus, helps to squarely   15
address such poverty by allowing to smooth consumption as can be inferred from its 
strong impact on permanent income reported in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 Determinants of ‘permanent income’ in rural Ethiopia 
Dependent variable: logarithm of real income  Cofficients  t-statistics 
Household size  -0.096  (16.57)** 
Farming systems  0.411  (8.21)** 
Female headed households (female reference group)  -0.05  -1.27 
Primary school completion of the household head  0.098  -1.76 
Primary school completion of wife  -0.013  -0.12 
Total land of the household   0.075  (2.92)** 
Age of the household head  0.001  -1.16 
Total current value of household assets  0  (4.83)** 
Crop sales either previous meher and belg (r1 & r4) or after last interview  0  (3.75)** 
Population of nearest town divided by the distance in km from the site  0  (2.89)** 
Dependency ratio  -0.117  (-1.28) 
Worked on someone elses land or other employment?  -0.103  (3.21)** 
Dummy for households which harvested teff during last season  0.011  -0.28 
Dummy for households which harvested coffees last season  0.124  (2.24)* 
Dummy for household which harvested chat last season  0.238  (4.93)** 
Number oxen owned (bulls, oxen and young bulls)  0.019  -1.71 
Access to credit  0.112  (3.68)** 
Constant 3.605  (24.83)** 
Observations 1159   
R-squared 0.37   
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Source: Shimeles (2004b).  
 
4.2  Finance and the poverty trap: liquidity constraint and poverty 
The discussions in the preceding section have brought out important facts regarding the 
role of credit for household welfare and overall poverty. The first point of interest is that 
a large percentage of people in rural areas do not have access to credit. And, these   16
people make up a large proportion of the chronically poor population. Second, 
households with access to some credit generally have a higher long term per capita 
consumption so that consumption smoothing occurs with relative ease among this group 
as opposed to the credit constrained population. This essentially brings into the picture 
the notion of a poverty trap. The idea is that credit or liquidity constrained households 
tend to experience long-term poverty due to slight shocks in the past. The nature of 
previous period or past consumption therefore has an important impact on current 
consumption. This is in sharp contrast to the life-cycle hypothesis of consumption 
growth, where among other things, due to perfect capital markets assumption, 
consumption will be unaffected by consumption or its determinants in the previous 
period since shocks are fully taken care of through the use of the financial market in that 
period. 
The most commonly applied theoretical models of household consumption growth are 
based on a general framework where households are assumed to maximize lifetime 
utility U, defined over consumption, subject to lifetime budget constraint (see Shimeles 
2005 for detail). 
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Where, Et is mathematical expectation conditional on all information available to the 
individual at time period t, δ is rate of subjective time preference, r is real rate of 
interest, ct is consumption, wt is earnings and At is physical assets. Using the sequential 
maximization rule, at any period t, optimal consumption will be given by Euler’s 
equation3 for constant rate of time preference and interest rate with the additional 
assumption that the only uncertainty the household faces originates only from the 
income earning process: 




t t t c u r c u E + + = + δ      (3) 
Equation (3) states that a typical household sets the marginal utility of expected 
consumption equal to the marginal utility of current consumption weighted by the rate 
of time preference and asset prices. This general formulation of the optimal 
consumption rule has sparked a large literature on consumption growth and its 
determinants in the theoretical as well as empirical literature. Particularly notable is the 
work by Hall (1978) which provided a testable hypothesis for the Life Cycle Model of 
Modglinai and Permanent Income Hypothesis of Friedman on household consumption 
growth. The immediate implication of equation (3) is that: 
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where εt+1 is a random disturbance term and Etεt+1 = 0. Equation (3) provided the basic 
framework for the large empirical literature that followed Hall’s (1978) seminal paper. 
Depending on the specific functional form of the utility function, a number of variants 
of equation (4) have been suggested, empirically estimated and in the process have 
spurred a controversy that is still alive and thriving.4 The first to spark immense 
attraction is Hall’s assumption of a quadratic utility function with a ‘bliss’ maximum 
point and constant rate of discount rate and interest rate, which led to a consumption 
function of the following form: 
1 0 1 + + + + = t t t c c ε γ β      (5) 
If we further assume away the ‘bliss’ point and add the assumption that the rate of time 
preference and interest rate are equal (which also could be interpreted as equality 
between the marginal rate of substitution between future and current consumption with 
marginal rate of transformation), we get the parsimonious model of consumption 
growth. That is, γ = 1, or current consumption has a unit root with respect to lagged 
consumption implying that consumption growth is a random-walk, except for its trend.5 
Equation (5) and its variants also imply that utility is time-separable and also additive. 
In addition, over their lifetime, households are assumed to be fully insured from income 
risk so that consumption is not affected by transitory changes in income. Thus, 
consumption growth is independent of past, current, or predictable changes in income. 
In addition, consumption patterns are independent of the riskiness of income.6 
Augmenting equation (5) with current disposable income and other wealth variables 
(Xits) therefore provides a basis for testing the life-cycle hypothesis: 
it kit k it it X c c ε β γ β + + + = ∑ + + 0 1        (6) 
Where βk are coefficients of the asset variables and the subscripts refer respectively 
individual household i, time t, and k asset-holdings. The implications of equation (6) 
and its variants in a developing country context have been investigated in the empirical 
literature (e.g. Morduch 1990, Deaton 1992, Ravallion and Chaudri 1997, Jocobi and 
Skoufias 1998). Recently, using data for selected developing countries, including that 
for Ethiopia, Skoufias and Quisumbing (2003) employed this framework to relate a 
household’s consumption variability with its vulnerability to poverty where per capita 
consumption growth is regressed on per capita income growth. Two sets of issues are at 
hand regarding equation (6) and its implications. With a quadratic utility function, and 
equality between rate of time preference and return to asset holdings, consumption over 
                                                 
4   A useful survey of this literature is found in, for example, Browning and Lusardi (1996), Hayashi 
(1997), Carroll (2001) and Browning and Crossley (2001). 
5   If consumers are relatively impatient (β<1/(1+r)), consumption declines gradually and if they are 
patient it rises. 
6   See Coleman (1998) for further details of the implications of the quadratic expected utility functional 
form.   18
time will be a random walk, except for its trend. Second, information on pervious 
earnings, asset holdings and other features of household fortune should not affect future 
consumption. Thus, a test of the life-cycle hypothesis involves examining the 
coefficients of cit and Xkit. 
Table 11 illustrates this fact very clearly where lagged consumption expenditure turned 
out to be an important factor in driving current consumption among poor households, 
while it did not among the persistently non-poor households. This suggests that the 
Martingale hypothesis is strongly rejected among poorer households perhaps due to the 
interplay of shocks and liquidity constraints. The negative sign of the coefficients of 
the lagged variables among poorer households is even more consistent with the liquidity 
constraint hypothesis where current and lagged consumption move in the opposite 
direction in response to unforeseen income shocks. 
The presence of liquidity constraint in our set-up suggests the possibility of multiple 
equilibria (see Figure 1) resulting in non-linearity in consumption growth (see also Jalan 
and Ravallion 2001). In this report we investigate for the existence of a poverty trap by 
examining non-linearity in consumption dynamics. From Figure 1 we see that concavity 
or non-linearity in consumption with respect to lagged consumption generates two 
stable or equilibrium points (Y* and Y**). The lower consumption level indicates a 
low-equilibrium trap. 
Shimeles (2005) reports that that between 1994 and 1995 approximately 44 per cent of 
households in the panel did experience a decline in their real per capita consumption 
expenditure or had negative consumption shock. Among these, only 50 per cent of 
households recovered fully from the negative shock in consumption expenditure in 
1997. Again among those who did not recover in 1997 from the 1994 negative shock, 
28 per cent recovered fully in 2000. Nearly 72 per cent of those with negative income 
 
Table 11 Real household consumption and its lag rural areas by the poverty status of 
households 
Poor households  Non-poor households  One period lagged 
variable 
Coefficient P-value  of 
Sargan’s Test  
Coefficient P-value of 
Sargan’s Test  





















Note:   Terms in parenthesis are z-values. 
Source:   Shimeles (2005).   19
 
Figure 1 Consumption dynamics and poverty trap 
 
shocks that did not recover in 1997 continued to live below an expenditure level they 
had had in 1994. All in all, about 16 per cent of sample households had a negative 
consumption shock in 1994 that was not recovered at all in 2000. From this brief 
encounter in consumption dynamics, it is easy to see that there may be some households 
who might find it very difficult to bounce back following an initial income shock either 
to their previous level of consumption or beyond. This motivates for a need to look at 
consumption growth or transitory consumption shocks a non-linear setting. 
The general empirical strategy we used below to test for non-linearity in consumption 
dynamics follows the specifications of Jalan and Ravallion (2001) as stated in 
equation (7): 




2 1 1 T t n i u y y y y it i it it it t it = = + + + + + + = − − − ε β β β γ α  
     (7) 
where  yit is per capita consumption in period t by household i. The econometric 
specification in (7) is typical of a dynamic panel data specification with fixed effect 
error correction. We used the Arnold-Bond Generalized Moments Method to estimate 
the coefficients of equation (7) for rural households in Ethiopia. The results are reported 
in Table 12 and evidently confirm for the existence of poverty traps as shown by the 
roots of the polynomials underlying the dynamics and the significance of the 
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Table 12 Non-linear dynamic model of consumption expenditure: rural areas 

















Sargan’s Test of overidentifying restrictions  0.0000  0.3417 
Note:   Terms in parenthesis are z-values. 
Source:   Shimeles (2005). 
The existence of the poverty trap suggests that due to the liquidity constraint and the 
resultant inability to smooth consumption over time, the bulk of rural households are 
entrapped in a low level equilibrium. This result has an interesting policy implication; 
that introducing efficient financial intermediaries in the rural villages may reduce 
poverty by easing the liquidity constraints of the poor. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper assesses the importance of financial development (in terms of access to 
credit) in explaining poverty and a poverty trap. Using panel data from Ethiopia that 
covers the period from 1994 to 2000, we, first, tested whether access to credit matters 
for the poverty. Using a parsimonious poverty-finance model and controlling for the 
possible endogeneity between access to credit and the poverty status of the households, 
we found out that access to credit significantly reduces absolute poverty. Having this 
result we attempted to investigate the channel through which finance may impact on 
poverty. This is found to be through (i) consumption smoothing and (ii) helping to 
escape the possibility of escaping a poverty trap which in turn is related to liquidity 
constraint. 
Second, we examined the importance of access to credit for consumption smoothing. 
Our results show that access to credit has a positive and significant effect on 
‘permanent’ consumption implying that credit is an important component of 
consumption smoothing and hence it is pro-poor as it enhances the welfare of the 
households. We also tested whether liquidity constraints lead to a poverty trap or not. 
As evidenced from the non-linearity of our dynamic consumption function, the rural 
households are faced with a poverty trap due to their inability in smoothing their 
consumption as a result of liquidity constraint.   21
An important policy implication of our result is that promoting the financial sector is a 
desirable pro-poor policy as it eases liquidity constraints. In addition, facilitating credit 
facilities for the rural poor where the formal sector is less interested to be involved in, 
can be an important intervention area for a sensible poverty reduction. It is imperative to 
note that the use of finance to address poverty is found to be as important as other 
determinants of poverty, finance being among the top five (out of 17) determinants of 
poverty with strong and statistically significant effect. 
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